2016考研英語閱讀熱點：奧巴馬比批評者更懂伊朗

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Obama reads Iran better than his critics

奧巴馬比批評者更懂伊朗

Those whom the gods will destroy they first make mad. Critics of Barack Obama’s Iran dealhave been giving a good impression of having lost the plot. An Israeli cabinet ministerdescribed it as “one of the darkest days in world history”. Republicans liken Mr Obama to NevilleChamberlain. All agree that a deal that removes about two-thirds of Iran’s nuclear capabilityand freezes the rest will somehow hasten the day it has the bomb. In the next two months,before Capitol Hill votes on it, we will hear a lot more such bombast. It comes down to whetherCongress believes Iran is capable of acting rationally or whether it is a uniquely malevolentcountry that has outfoxed America and its partners in the negotiating chamber.

上帝欲使其滅亡，必先使其瘋狂。美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克攠巴馬(Barack Obama)與伊朗核協(xié)議的批評者給人一種喪失理智的強烈感覺。以色列一位內閣部長稱其為“世界歷史上最黑暗的日子之一”。共和黨人則將奧巴馬比作內維爾張伯倫(Neville Chamberlain，二戰(zhàn)前對納粹德國實行綏靖政策的英國首相——譯者注)。所有人都認為，一個消除伊朗大約三分之二的核能力、凍結其他核設施的協(xié)議，將以某種方式加快伊朗擁有核武器的那一天來臨。在美國國會就該協(xié)議投票之前的未來兩個月里，我們還會聽到大量此類的夸大言辭。這歸根到底要看國會是否相信伊朗能夠理智行事，抑或伊朗是一個與眾不同的邪惡國家，在談判室里智勝了美國及其伙伴。

The chances are that Mr Obama’s deal will prevail. He needs the veto-proof support of just athird of each chamber — 34 senators and 145 in the House of Representatives. Even then,however, it is no sure bet. In the next 60 days it will face the onslaught of Israel, Saudi Arabia,and every Republican presidential hopeful. In addition to viewing Iran in an apocalyptic light,each has further motives for wishing to sink the deal.

奧巴馬的協(xié)議很可能獲得通過。該協(xié)議只要分別獲得參眾兩院三分之一議員(34名參議員和145名眾議員)的支持，就不怕遭到否決。然而即便如此，它也不是板上釘釘的事情。未來60天期間，它還將面臨以色列、沙特阿拉伯以及每一位共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人競爭者的攻擊。除了以世界末日的透鏡看待伊朗之外，這些人還各自有其它動機希望該協(xié)議夭折。

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the logic is simple. Iran is Saudi Arabia’s chief competitor thatclaims to speak for the region’s Shia minority, a large chunk of which lives in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich east. In a sectarian zero-sum game, anything that boosts Iran is bad.

沙特方面的邏輯很簡單。伊朗是沙特的主要競爭對手，號稱代表該地區(qū)的什葉派少數人群(其中一大部分生活在沙特盛產石油的東部省份)。在一場宗派沖突的零和游戲中，任何有利于伊朗的事情都是壞事。

Israel’s opposition is also straightforward. As the region’s only nuclear weapons state —albeit an undeclared one — it wants to keep its monopoly. The fact that the deal would setback Iran’s breakout capacity from two months to a year is false comfort, say the Israelis. Bybringing a pariah state in from the cold, it will perversely raise the chances Iran eventually goesnuclear.

以色列的反對也直截了當。作為中東地區(qū)唯一擁有核武器的國家(盡管沒有宣告)，以色列希望保持其壟斷地位。以色列人表示，核協(xié)議將讓伊朗取得足夠裂變材料的時間從兩個月倒退至一年，這一點給人一種虛假的安慰。另一方面，讓一個被拋棄的國家重新進入國際社會，將以某種方式提高該國最終擁有核武器的幾率。

Finally, Republicans see Mr Obama as a feckless president who is jeopardising US power simplyby talking to a terrorist state. The quality of the deal is irrelevant. Nothing short of regimechange will do. Some of these motives overlap. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeliprime minister, shares the Republican party’s personal animus towards Mr Obama. What unitesthem is a refusal to see Iran as capable of change.

最后，共和黨人認為奧巴馬是一個不負責任的總統(tǒng)，他與一個恐怖主義國家談判，這件事本身就會危及美國實力。協(xié)議質量是無關的。除了政權更迭，其它解決方案都不行。這些動機中有些是重疊的。例如，以色列總理本雅明蔠呑尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)和共和黨人一樣對奧巴馬抱有個人敵意。讓他們站到一起的原因是，他們都拒絕認為伊朗會改變。

Mr Obama has taken the opposite tack. A realistic negotiator puts himself into his adversary’sshoes. The starting point on Iran is that its desire to go nuclear is entirely rational. US-ledcoalitions have invaded two of Iran’s direct neighbours, Iraq and Afghanistan in the past 15years. American troops are still there. As a rule, the US does not invade countries that havenuclear weapons. Moreover, the US labelled Iran part of the “axis of evil” in 2002, at a timewhen Tehran wanted to help the US in Afghanistan, where they shared enmity with the Taliban(as they still do). Mohammad Khatami, the moderate cleric who was then Iran’s president, hadalso signalled a nuclear deal was possible. Had President George W Bush responded, a farbetter one would have been available. Instead, he branded Iran evil. Unsurprisingly, Tehranstepped up its clandestine efforts.

奧巴馬卻采取不同的策略。一名務實的談判者善于從對手的視角看待問題。伊朗問題的起點是，該國發(fā)展核武器的想法是完全理性的。在過去15年里，以美國為首的盟國入侵了伊朗的兩個近鄰——伊拉克和阿富汗。美軍部隊現在仍駐扎在這兩個國家。一般說來，美國不會入侵擁有核武器的國家。此外，2002年正當德黑蘭希望在阿富汗幫助美國之際——伊朗也對塔利班抱有敵意(現在仍是如此)——美國卻將伊朗貼上“邪惡軸心”的標簽。時任伊朗總統(tǒng)的溫和派神職人員穆罕默德哈塔米(Mohammad Khatami)也暗示稱，有可能簽署核協(xié)議。如果當時美國總統(tǒng)喬治·W·布什(George W Bush)做出回應，將會得到一份比現在好得多的協(xié)議。結果布什卻將伊朗歸入邪惡國家之列。并不令人意外的是，德黑蘭加快了其秘密研發(fā)核武器的努力。

Second, Iran’s decision to mothball its nuclear ambitions in exchange for economic relief isalso rational. It is unlikely to give up on it lightly. It followed a decade’s worth of US-ledsanctions that has brought the country’s economy to its knees. The regime of Ayatollah AliKhamenei, supreme leader, clearly thinks it will help its chances of survival.

其次，伊朗決定擱置核野心以換取經濟制裁的解除也是理性的。伊朗不太可能輕易放棄自己的核計劃。它采取此舉之前，以美國為首的國際社會實施了10年制裁，令伊朗經濟陷入癱瘓。最高領導人阿亞圖拉阿里哈梅內伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)的政權顯然認為，擱置核野心有助于增加政權的生存機會。

It is possible, as Mr Obama’s critics predict, that Iran will spend much of the estimated $100bnin unfrozen assets on regional proxies — Hizbollah at the forefront. So what? Compared to theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) and its mimics, Hizbollah is a restrained actor. Itstheology is absolutist and it has carried out terrorist attacks. But it is not a death cult. In aworld of bad choices, boosting Hizbollah’s clout is an acceptable price to pay for a deal thatdelays — and possibly dispels — the spectre of a Middle East nuclear arms race.

正如奧巴馬的批評者所預測，伊朗可能會用估計有1000億美元的解凍資產的很大一部分資助地區(qū)代理人，尤其是真主黨。但這又如何?與“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)及其模仿者相比，真主黨算是一支克制的力量。真主黨的宗教體系是專制主義，該組織曾發(fā)動過恐怖襲擊，但并不是一個死亡邪教組織。在一個只有糟糕選擇的世界，對于一份能延遲(且有可能消除)中東核軍備競賽隱患的協(xié)議，提升真主黨的影響力是一個可以接受的代價。

None of this cuts much ice with Mr Obama’s critics. Yet his detractors offer no realisticalternatives. Many Republican candidates are promising to rescind the Iran deal on “day one”of their presidency. Diplomatic norms prevent Mr Obama from pointing out that Iran is a morepromising candidate for peaceful change than Saudi Arabia. Unlike that country, Iran has aquasi-democracy. About half of its university graduates are female. There are competing powercentres within Iran’s theological regime. Prospects for further relaxation are easy to imagine.By contrast, the House of Saud rests on brittle foundations. Who dares guess what wouldcome after it? Iran is a natural counterbalance to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi theocracy. As anon-Arab country, it is incapable of dominating the Middle East. There is also the small matterof how to defeat Isis. Without Iran’s help, the US would be in far worse straits.

這些理由都不能說服奧巴馬的批評者，但他的詆毀者們也拿不出現實可行的替代方案。多名共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人競爭者承諾，上任“第一天”就要取消伊朗核協(xié)議。外交規(guī)矩意味著奧巴馬不能指出，比起沙特阿拉伯，伊朗更有希望發(fā)生和平變革。與沙特不同，伊朗擁有一個準民主體制，約一半的大學畢業(yè)生是女性。伊朗的神權政權內部存在著相互競爭的權力中心，很容易想象進一步放松的前景。與此形成對比的是，沙特王室根基脆弱，誰知道接替它的會是什么?伊朗是沙特阿拉伯瓦哈比(Wahhabi)神權政治的天然抗衡。作為非阿拉伯國家，伊朗無法主宰中東。此外，別忘了還有如何擊敗伊斯蘭國的“小”問題。沒有伊朗的幫助，美國將陷入更糟糕的困境。

There are moments when US presidents take risks that alter the world as we know it. RonaldReagan’s friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev is one instance. Richard Nixon’s opening to China isanother. Mr Obama’s deal with Iran is almost as breathtaking in its scope.

在歷史長河的某些關頭，美國總統(tǒng)冒險改變世人熟知的世界格局。羅納德里根(Ronald Reagan)與米哈伊爾戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)的友誼是一例，理查德尼克松(Richard Nixon)向中國開放又是一例。奧巴馬與伊朗達成協(xié)議之舉是近乎同樣宏大的手筆。